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Abstract. Based on an inter-temporal general equilibrium model, we rigorously derive 
a measurement method using dynamic changes in cross-sectional hedonic prices to 
estimate the willingness to pay for urban esthetic projects. The method has advantages 
in common with a difference-in-differences approach. For example, fewer attributes are 
used as explanatory variables than with a cross-sectional hedonic approach because 
fixed effects can be ignored. It can therefore mitigate problems related to omitted 
variables and multicollinearity, which are prevalent in cross-sectional hedonic 
approaches. Nevertheless, either the measurement or one additional assumption of 
marginal utility of income is necessary for provision of correct measures. In addition, 
we consider the existence of condominiums, which has not been supposed in 
conventional hedonic approaches but must always be considered in practical situations. 
We apply the method to utility line undergrounding projects.  
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1. Introduction 
In many countries, a prerequisite of public projects is an economic evaluation of the project. 
One difficulty of conducting such an evaluation is measuring the value of non-market goods 
associated with land such as local environment and public facilities (e.g., local crime rates, 
school quality and transportation), which we call amenities hereafter. A typical methodology 
is a hedonic approach, which assumes perfect mobility of households across locations. Land 
prices reflect the residents’ willingness to pay for such amenities because households move to 
areas offering high levels of amenities. This paper provides a rigorous derivation of a method 
measuring the willingness to pay for changes in amenities, using time-dimensional difference 
in cross-sectional differences in land prices, with an inter-temporal general equilibrium model, 
and applies the method to an aesthetic project. 
Land prices reflect the land use and the residents’ preferences. Therefore, they have been 
used for measuring difficult-to-observe factors. For land use, recently Brueckner et al. (2017) 
derived a novel approach of measuring the stringency of the floor area ratio regulation. For 
residents’ preferences, the relation between cross-sectional hedonic prices and willingness to 
pay for amenities at a single time has been discussed at length in numerous papers (e.g., Rosen 
(1974), Polinsky and Shavell (1975, 1976); Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1977, 1978); and 
Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978)). Likewise, land rents differ in time-series data according to 
the time-series difference in amenities, which is explored by Starrett (1981), Case and Quigley 
(1991) and others. If we employ cross-sectional data at different times, we can observe time-
dimensional difference in cross-sectional difference data. 
While analyses discussed in most prior papers regarding cross-sectional hedonic 
approaches (e.g., Pines and Weiss (1976); Scotchmer (1985, 1986); Kanemoto (1988)) assume 
a common equilibrium utility level over locations at a certain time based on the free migration 
assumption, our approach based on the difference-in-differences supposes that the common 
‘equilibrium utility’ changes equally over time in all locations. This supposition is novel in the 
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hedonic approach literature. The inter-temporal common ‘equilibrium utility’ change in all 
locations involves the changes in land rents and the amenities. For that reason, their dynamic 
relation is obtainable; the willingness to pay for the improved amenities can be evaluated in a 
different manner from those using only cross-sectional differences at a single time.  
Furthermore, while those previous papers mainly explore the relation between land rents 
and the social surplus, the current paper explores the relation between land rents and the 
resident’s willingness to pay for amenities. From this difference, our discussion is different 
from the case of social surplus, which includes land revenue. Indeed, we can evaluate the 
project without assuming any economic conditions (e.g. small-open conditions) which are 
often assumed for measuring social surplus.  
Surprisingly, most theoretical discussions on the hedonic approach have been confined to 
a static framework even though land prices are determined with a non-instant change in 
amenities and forward-looking households in a dynamic framework. Bishop and Murphy 
(2011), arguing that a drawback of traditional cross-sectional hedonic literature is the 
assumption of a myopic decision in a static framework, estimate the willingness to pay for 
reducing violent crime, using a dynamic model. They find a myopic model underestimates this 
willingness to pay because a dynamic approach involves forward-looking households.  
To avoid this bias arising from ignoring a dynamic framework, we adopt an inter-temporal 
equilibrium model, and develop a hedonic model to explain how housing prices capitalize 
large environmental shocks. Without using an inter-temporal equilibrium, Kuminoff and Pope 
(2014) compare the pre- and post-shock price functions to obtain sufficient conditions of the 
price functions with which the parameters of the function can imply the marginal willingness 
to pay for an environmental factor. The sufficient conditions 1  they obtain for exact 
measurements with their method are (i) restrictions on preferences, income and technology to 
 
1 See Kuminoff and Pope (2014) for the exact description. These conditions are shown on page 1234 of 
their paper.  
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be constant over the duration of the study, (ii) restrictions on the shapes of supply and demand 
curves so that the marginal price of the environmental factor does not depend on the level of 
the factor, and (iii) further restrictions on supply and demand such that changes in the 
environmental factor do not affect the hedonic gradient. In short, if these three conditions hold, 
the difference between pre- and post-shock price functions is equal to the marginal willingness 
to pay for the environmental factor. So, clarification of these conditions is useful. 
The current paper also derives a measurement method for the marginal willingness to pay, 
but it does this in a different way. First, our model is a dynamic model whereas Kuminoff and 
Pope (2014) use two static models at different points in time. Second, we use a difference-in-
differences whereas Kuminoff and Pope (2014) use a difference in time–series between pre- 
and post-shock price functions. So, we obtain different sufficient conditions and a different 
measurement process from Kuminoff and Pope (2014). Actually, some conditions shown in 
Kuminoff and Pope (2014) might limit the situations in which their method can be applied. 
For example, their restrictions on income to be constant over the duration of the study and 
those on supply and demand curves are both unnecessary for our method in theory, although 
similar restrictions might make our empirical steps simpler in practice. But, instead, we need 
either the measurement or the assumption of marginal utility of income for provision of correct 
measures. With this difference, the Kuminoff and Pope method or the method of the current 
paper can be used when appropriate. 
Our method has advantages in common with difference-in-differences approach. One 
advantage of our method is that fewer attributes are used as explanatory variables than when 
using the traditional cross-sectional approach. Correspondingly, the proposed approach tends 
to avoid multicolinearity problems in parameter estimation, which often arise in cross-
sectional hedonic regressions. Using panel data to reduce the number of explanatory attributes 
is exploited also in the repeat-sales hedonic regression developed by Palmquist (1982). Such 
reduction is possible because characteristics that do not change over time can be omitted from 
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the regression equation, whereas a cross-sectional hedonic approach should factor in all the 
geographically different amenities to explain the rent differences. Furthermore, recent papers 
such as those of Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) and Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) use 
panel data to incorporate location-specific fixed effects into the hedonic approach. Using panel 
data removes such fixed effects and estimates the impacts of the change in amenities. Thus, 
our proposed methods can also mitigate the problem of omitted variable bias. 
However, unlike the current paper, these previous papers employing panel data confine 
the discussion to the relation between equilibrium land rents and amenities (i.e. hedonic 
regression only), and do not explore the relation between the equilibrium utility and amenities. 
Therefore, they cannot obtain any method to measure the willingness to pay for amenities. As 
demonstrated in Scotchmer (1985, 1986) and as discussed in the conclusion of Palmquist 
(1982), any hedonic rent including the repeat-sales hedonic approach measures neither the 
willingness to pay nor the social benefit for improved amenities unless the level of the 
residential utility is somehow unchanged by the improved amenities (e.g. by the assumption 
of a small–open city). We measure the resident’s willingness to pay for amenities using the 
data on rents, and amenity levels without the small-open assumption.  
To calculate the willingness to pay by households, we need lot sizes as the cross-sectional 
hedonic approach does. Actually, the traditional approaches have ignored the existence of 
condominiums for calculating the willingness to pay. However, in particular in urban areas, 
condominiums are common. So, we seek the measurement method useful for the existence of 
condominiums. In this case, we use the relationship between housing lot rents and land rents, 
which is also used in Brueckner et al. (2017). 
We apply our proposed method to estimate the willingness to pay for utility line 
undergrounding pole removal. Overhead electric wires along roads are ugly and the poles 
block the flows of cars and pedestrians. Particularly in Japan, because electric and telephone 
wires are spread all over cities and most roads in residential areas are narrow, the problems 
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with the effects of wires and poles are rather important. Accordingly, there are strong calls for 
undergrounding utility lines. We measure the willingness to pay for utility line undergrounding  
using the data of the Tokyo metropolitan areas. In addition, we compare our results and 
estimation procedures to those of a traditional cross-sectional hedonic approach. 
Simultaneously, we show advantages and disadvantages of our proposed method in 
comparison to the traditional cross-sectional approach. 
Hedonic approaches are practical approaches, so the situations in which they are applied 
vary greatly. Accordingly, many papers take account of various practical aspects. For example, 
Kuminoff and Pope (2014) focus on the sorting processes which heterogeneous agents 
generate. However, the current paper only targets the homogeneous agent case mainly because 
this helps clarify the mechanism behind the method. This is limited, but this situation can be 
applied to many practical situations. For example, new development areas are usually 
composed of similar agents in the sense that they have similar incomes and similar life stages. 
Actually, to focus on the homogenous case, we can rigorously consider a spatial equilibrium 
and derive a novel measurement method.  
Extension of our method to heterogenous residents is not difficult, and is discussed in the 
summary section. Likewise, as Parmeter and Pope (2012) note, endogeneity problems in 
estimation have been explored in hedonic papers. To avoid such problems, recent studies have 
begun to apply the hedonic approach to areas with data suited for quasi-experiments (e.g., 
Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Hallstrom and Smith, 2005; Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 
2008). Specifically, Koster and Ommeren (2019) use discontinuity design to consider the 
heterogeneity in a spatial context. Actually, our proposed method can be straightforwardly 
applied to such quasi-experiments if target areas have panel data. Indeed, such quasi-
experiment approaches often involve dynamic data (as in Koster and van Ommeren, 2019).  
Section 2 develops a model and derives a relationship between the willingness to pay for 
amenities and the dynamics of land rent based on the dynamic model. Section 3, adding some 
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reasonable assumptions, obtains a practical measurement method using only data at two points 
of time before and after the improvement in amenities. Section 4 compares the proposed 
approach with the traditional cross-sectional hedonic approach. Next, Section 5 applies our 
method to estimate the value of undergrounding utility lines empirically as an illustrative 
application example. Finally, we conclude the paper.  
2. Model and willingness to pay for amenities 
We derive the willingness to pay for amenities by using the relationship between the dynamic 
change in utility, rents and amenities in a dynamic model. Our target is to obtain the formula 
for measuring the willingness to pay for amenities with observable economic variables (e.g., 
rents, housing lot sizes, and amenity levels). We suppose multiple amenities. Some amenities 
change dynamically and other amenities do not change. The dynamic change in amenities are 
often caused by public projects (e.g., subway construction). Projects often have so-called 
announcement effects, meaning that planning the project affects the economy somehow when 
it is announced publicly. Accordingly, the effect of a project will begin before the project 
actually starts. In addition, in most projects, amenities improve slowly over many years (e.g. 
construction of parks, development of stations, etc.).  
To simplify the discussion, we suppose that amenities are improved by projects, and we 
evaluate the willingness to pay for the project. This supposition does not lose the generality at 
all. If some amenities change due to natural change in the environment, we just suppose that 
the change is caused by ‘natural projects’. Amenities are expressed by iΑ , which is a set of 
amenities at location i over time points,      0 , )( , , ii i itA A A A  , where {0 , , }, , t   
is a set of time indices. Furthermore,  iA t   is a set of amenities of various types, i.e., 
       ( , ,..., )i i i iA t t t ta b e (e.g.  i ta  is the existence of overhead wires,  ib t  is distance to 
the station,  ic t  is quality of parks, and so on), which expresses the levels of amenities at 
location i at time t. We assume five kinds of amenities without loss of generality. The following 
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theory does not depend on the number of amenities. The amenities include any location-related 
utility-enhancing and utility-worsening factors without prices.  
For individuals, amenities iA  are exogenous variables. A project increases the level of 
each component of amenities. Figure 1 shows a project of improving amenity ( ) ( )i ia t A t  for 
example. Subscript 0 or 1 implies before or after a project.  Multiple projects are implemented 
in the real world, so amenities change from 0iA   to 1iA  . In order to take account of the 
announcement effect and the project duration, we suppose that the project starts at time cT n  
and finishes at time cT , as shown in Figure 1, and  the announcement effect occurs at time aT , 
which is before cT n . To avoid measurement biases due to the announcement effect, the 
benefit measurement method uses the data of time T-m, which is before aT , and time T, which 
is after the completion of the project. It is assumed that any future change in amenities is not 
expected before the announcement of the project.  
 
Figure 1  Change in amenity ( ) ( )i ia t A t  and data collection timing 
 
2.1 Household Behavior 
We use a dynamic model to derive a benefit measurement formula for amenities. The model 
assumes that the target area comprises homogeneous individuals, who have homogeneous 
utility functions and equal income. The target area has I zones, each of which is labeled
Time t
A
𝑇௖ െ  𝑛
Project
start
𝑇௖
𝐴ଵ௜
𝑇 െ 𝑚 𝑇
Project
end𝑇௔
Announcement
of project
Data
before project
Data
after project
Expected dynamics
of amenities before
the announcement
Expected dynamics
of amenities after
the announcement
Amenity ( )ia t
1( )ia t  
0( )ia t  
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{1,..., }i I . This homogeneity assumption might sound unrealistic. However, we do not have 
to target all residential areas affected by projects. We can choose areas with relatively 
homogenous residents (e.g., with Regression Discontinuity Design). This point is also 
discussed in the conclusion.   
At time t, individuals living in zone i consume the composite good  i tx  at price 1, setting 
the good as the numeraire good, housing lot size at time t,  i th  at the housing lot rent  i tr . 
2 In Section 2, we assume only houses, not condominiums. In Section 3, we first derive a 
benefit measurement method based on this model in Subsection 3.1, and then we extend the 
model to include the case of condominiums in Subsection 3.2. 
The willingness to pay for amenities is definable simply using the indirect lifetime utility 
function. Individual behavior is expressed as the maximization of the lifetime utility at a given 
income. The individual maximizes his lifetime indirect utility at any time z {0 , },  . The 
lifetime is set up to infinity as the dynasty model sets. This can be justified if their descendants’ 
utilities are supposed to be considered with a discount rate. If the dynamics of amenities is 
given as      0 , )( , , ii i itA A A A   , the behavior of an individual living in zone i from 
time z to ∞ is expressed as  
               , , 1max , ,ii i i tx t h t it s t zV x A ttz u h t 


 
    (1) 
            . .     1 0,  , 1,...,i i i i i is t w t s t x t t h t s t t z zr           (2a) 
   is exogenously given.i zs   (2b) 
  lim 0t i
t
s t    , (2c) 
 
2 In real cities, land consumption is fixed for some time because cost is required for adjusting the 
size. However, for simple exposition, the current paper assumes free adjustment cost so that land 
consumption (i.e. lot size)  at time t,  i th  is variable with time.  Actually, even if the adjustment 
costs are considered, the conclusions do not change. 
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where ( )iV z is the lifetime utility function for an individual living in zone i from time z to 
time , and       , ,i i iu x t h t A t  is the per-time utility function for an individual living in 
zone i at time t. ( 1)    is a gross (not net) discount factor.  iw t  is the given income level of 
an individual living in zone i.  
The housing lot is owned by absentee landowners so that the land revenue is not returned 
to the residents. The current paper assumes that amenities do not affect  iw t  for simplicity3, 
although we can take account of this effect easily by assuming a wage function  ,iw t Α . That 
is, the current paper targets amenities affecting residents. In addition, people at time z might 
plan to migrate in the future, while eq. (1) supposes no migration. However, if free migration 
is assumed, as described later, the lifetime utility at any time is constant across locations. So, 
the current model is valid even in the existence of migration. 
We can sum up eq. (2) over time z to   for an individual living in zone i. 
                     i i i t i i t i t
t z t z t z
s s x t r t h t w tz          
  
        , (3) 
where  is z  is the initial given endowments at z .  is     should be 0 from a non-Ponzi 
condition. Therefore, we can rewrite eq. (2a) as  
       ( )  i i t i i t
t z t z
W x t tz r t h   
 
    , (4) 
where    ( )i i t i
t z
z wW s zt   

   is the present value of income. 
The indirect utility function is obtained as follows. * * (( ( ), ( ), ( )) )i i i i t
t z
V u x t h t A tz  

 , 
where optimal demand *( )ix t   and *( )ih t   are obtained as the functions of 
 
3 The version of taking account of changes in wages associated with amenities can be obtained from 
the authors. 
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[ , ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( )) ](i i i i iW r z r A z Az   , which are exogenous for residents. Substituting these 
optimal demand functions into the utility function, we obtain 
[ , ( ),..( ., ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ,..., ( )) ]i i i i i i iV V W r z rz Az z Az   , (5) 
which implies the indirect utility function is the function of 
[ , ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( )) ](i i i i iW r z r A z Az   . 
The supply of land4 is fixed in each zone, 
( ) ( )i i iN t h t H  (6) 
where ( )iN t  is the population of zone I, and iH is the fixed area of zone i. 
Individuals can migrate to seek a higher utility level. Regarding migration, we assume 
Assumption 1, as in the traditional hedonic approach. 
 
Assumption 1. The utility level is equal among locations at any time.  
 
Assumption 1 holds when people migrate freely. In the real world, migration cost is not 
zero; however, the cost can be negligible from the long-term viewpoint. Due to Assumption 1, 
in equilibrium at any time z, the utility levels of individuals are equal among zones in which 
the number of individuals is positive. That is, we have 
   iV z zV  if   0i zN   for {1,..., }i I , and             (7a) 
   jV z zV  if   0j zN   for {1,..., }j I ,                           (7b)    
where ( )zV  expresses the equilibrium utility of an individual at time t. For our purpose, the 
city can be either open or closed. Accordingly, the equilibrium utility  zV  can be determined 
either exogenously (in open city cases) or endogenously (in closed city cases). 
 
4 Actually, in hedonic approaches, rents after the projects are observed or forecasted. So, formulating the 
supply side of land is not necessary. The current paper, assuming a general equilibrium framework, 
provides a rigorous derivation of a benefit measurement formula from it.  
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The equilibrium solution of the above general equilibrium model is ascertained as follows. 
We can obtain the equilibrium rent as  [ ( ),..., ( )]ir t z Α Α   because [ ( ),..., ( )]z Α Α   are 
exogenous policy variables for the general equilibrium model, where 
     1( ,) )( , , i It A At t tAA  . That implies that the equilibrium housing lot rent depends on 
[ ( ),..., ( )]z Α Α  . Substituting this into eq. (5), we derive the equilibrium lifetime indirect 
utility function as  
       , ( ),..., ( )],..., ( ),..., (( , ) ( ) ( )[ )[ , ,..] .,)i i i i i i iV V W r z r z Az z z z A   A Α Α Α Α  .               
           (8) 
 
2.2 Relationship between willingness to pay for amenities and land rents 
The willingness to pay for a change in an amenity can be defined using the monetary-measured 
change in the indirect utility associated with a change in the amenity. Because the indirect 
utility depends on when it is defined, the willingness to pay depends on the year at which the 
utility is measured. Although our model can measure it at any time, the current paper measures 
the willingness to pay at time T, which is the time of data collection after the project’s end.  
The change in the lifetime indirect utility function at T from the original amenity level 
0A  to the improved level 1A  is expressed as 
   
      
      
 
 
   
 1 1
0 0
1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
, ,
, ( ),..., ( )],..., ( ),..., ( )]
, ( ),..
( ) ( )[ )
., ( )],..., ( ),...,
[ , ,...,
( ) ( )]( )[ )[ , ,...,
i i
i i
i i
i i i i
i i i i
i ii
i
t
i i
i i
T
V T V T
V W r z r z A A
V
z z z
zW zr z r z A A
r t VV d
r t
z
T
t
t


   
 


 
     
Α Α
Α Α
A A
Α Α Α Α
Α Α Α Α
AA A     for { : 0}ii i td i i N A
  (9) 
where    i tr t A   is the vector of the derivative of  ), (ir z zΑ   with respect to each 
component of the vector  ( )zΑ .  d tA  is the vector of the differential of each component of 
the vector  ( )zΑ . The mathematical symbol ‘  ’ is an inner product between the vectors. The 
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same expression is used in the second term and thereafter. The last line is obtained from 
rewriting the second line using the integral of the derivatives of function iV . Note that we 
have already supposed that the wage ( )iW T  is independent of amenities iΑ .  
The first term on the last line in eq. (9) includes    i iV T r t  , which is marginal lifetime 
indirect utility with respect to housing lot rent, and       i tr t dt A A  is the change in land 
rent associated with a change in amenities. The second term,   1
0
i
i
i i iTV d 
A
A
A A  , is a 
marginal indirect utility of the individual for amenities. We want to estimate the value of this 
term in terms of money. Among the terms of the first line and last lines of eq. (9), 
   1 0, ,i iV T V TA A  on the first line and    i iV T tr   and   iiV T A on the last line are 
unobservable because these are related to utility, which is inherently unobservable.  
To measure the willingness to pay for amenities using observable terms, we must 
eliminate the unobservable terms from Eq. (9). Here we can use Assumption 1. As Appendix 
1 shows, if Assumption 1 holds, we can derive Eq. (10) from Eq. (9), using the dynamic 
difference in cross-sectional differences of residential utility, i.e.,    1 0, ,i iV z V z A A
   1 0, ,IIV z V zA A  , where location I is selected by presuming 0IN    without loss of 
generality.  
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
( )( )
( ,)( )
i
i
I
I
i
i i
t i
ii
t T
i
I
I
t I
II
t T
I
i i
I
I I
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 
A A
A A
A A
A A
AA AA
AA AA
 
 
  (10) 
for locations  { 1,2,..., 1: 0 }i ti i I N    .   
 
The term,    ( () )i i iiV V WT T   A , in Eq. (10) represents the willingness to pay 
for the amenity in terms of income. We want to measure this value. Besides this term, Eq. (10) 
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has only one unobserved term  i iV WT  . So, to measure the willingness to pay for the 
amenities, we have to know    
i i
I I
T
T
V W
V W
 
   in Eq. (10). We can approach this term 
in two ways: Approach 1) assuming    i i I IT TV W V W    , and Approach 2) measuring    
i i
I I
T
T
V W
V W
 
  . We will explain them individually.  
Approach 1). The first approach is simple. Actually, this term vanishes from Eq. (10) if 
   i i I IT TV W V W     holds. We denote this equality as Assumption 2. 
 
Assumption 2 (Equal marginal utility of income among locations) 
   i I
i I
V
W W
T TV    for any location  { 1,2,..., 1: 0 }i ti i I N    .  
Two examples in which Assumption 2 holds are as follows. First, if the utility function is 
a quasi-linear utility function (e.g. ( , , ) ( , )i i i i i i iu x h g h x A A ), then the marginal utility with 
respect to income is constant in all locations at any time t. In this case,   1i iV T W    for 
any location i. Accordingly, Assumption 2 holds. Another example is when the distribution of 
income is always adjusted to be optimal. At optimal, the marginal utility with respect to income 
should be identical in all locations. That implies that the relation i i I IV W V W      
 { 1,2,..., 1: 0 }i ti i I N     holds. 
Approach 2). The second approach uses the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion 
to obtain the relation between  i iV WT  and  I IV WT  . The lifetime utility function is 
expressed as     ( ) ,, , , ii i i iz zV W r r A A A . If the function is strongly separable into the 
wage and other variables,  ( )i ii zV WW
 
 ( )I I
I
zV W
W
 
 
2
2
(( ) ( ) ( ))
I I
i I
I
V W
W z zW
z
W
   , using a 
first-order expansion to the lifetime utility function with respect to the wage. This can be 
arranged into    ( ) ( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )]i i I I i Ii Iz zV W V W W WW W z z
 
      , where    2 1
2
( ) ( )I I I
I I
V W V Wz z
W W
     is an Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion on the 
wage. For example, if the lifetime utility function takes 
    1, , exp(, ( ))( )ii i i izV r r W zg    A A A ), then the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute 
risk aversion is constant in all locations. Using this equation, i Ii IV VW W
 
   can be measured 
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with observable variables if the Arrow–Pratt measure is measured (e.g., Becker et al. (1964) 
and Levy and Levy (2001)). We can apply ii
i I
I
V V
W W
      to Eq. (10).  
Summing what we have obtained, we have Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1 (relationship between land rent and willingness to pay for amenities). If 
Assumption 1 holds, using Eq. (10), the resident’s willingness to pay for the marginal 
change in the amenities at location i, that is (    
i i
i i
T
T
V A
V W
 
  ), can be obtained 
from the dynamic change in land rents, land consumption and the amenities, irrespective 
of whether the city is open or closed. 
 
Note that Assumption 1, which is necessary for Lemma 1, is different from the so-called 
small-open assumption. The small-open implies that the project is so small that it does not 
affect the equilibrium utility level. However, under Assumption 1, the equilibrium utility level 
can change dynamically with a change in amenities or other factors. In other words, 
Assumption 1 holds more widely than the small-open assumption. 
 
3. Derivation of a measurement formula 
3.1 Cases in which amenities change instantly 
This section derives a formula to estimate the willingness to pay for amenities using only data 
at two points: before and after the amenities change, using Lemma 1. To simplify notation, we 
define the present value of the expenditure for housing lot consumption as  
 
   , ,i i i t
t z
H z th r 

A A  . (11) 
We apply Eq. (11) to Eq. (10) and assume that each element of the vector  i iV T A  is 
constant for the respective amenity change to obtain 
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          
 
   
 
   1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0, , , ,
0,Ii
i i I I
i I
i
I
I
i
i I
Ii
H T H T T H T
V T V T
V T V T
W W
H     
                          
A A A A
A AA A A A 
  (12) 
where 1 0i iA A   is a vector of the change in each element from 0 to 1. Note that 
             
( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)[ ... ... ...]
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
V T V T V T V T V T V T V T
T T T T T Ta b e a b e
      
        A 　  . 
 
   1 0, ,i iTH H TA A  is the increase in the present value of expenditure for housing 
lot consumption in location i from pre-project amenity 0A  to post-project amenity 1A . The 
first bracket [ ] implies the difference of that term between location i and location I. If 
amenities A  changes at once at time T , i.e., c c AT T T n T    , we can observe the 
amount in the bracket. The second bracket, which expresses the marginal value of a dynamic 
change in the amenities, can be alternatively expressed as  
 
   1 0i
i
i
i
i
i
V T
V T
W
        
A A A  
 
 
 
 1 0 1 0( ) ( )( ) ( )) ..( (. ( ) ( ))
i i
i i
i i i i
i i
t T t T
i i
V T V T
a e
a a eV T V T
t tt
W
t e
W
t t
 
 
 
   

 

   ,     (13) 
where    ( )
i i
i i
t T
V T V
t
T
a W


 
   is the present value of the willingness to pay for an increase in 
amenity ( )ia t  . The last bracket is that for location I. Accordingly, we can estimate the 
willingness to pay for amenities by using Eq. (12). For example, if the announcement effect is 
the total effect in a project, Eq. (12) can measure the willingness to pay for the amenities. 
3.2 Cases in which amenities change slowly 
In most projects, amenities change slowly. In this case, Eq. (12) cannot estimate the 
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willingness to pay for amenities with observable variables because we cannot obtain the first 
bracket [ ], which is composed of the expenditure for the housing lot consumption before and 
after the amenities change when the total effect of the project is supposed to occur at time T.  
To cope with this, we rewrite Eq. (12) as follows. We can express   0,iH T A  as 
        0 0 0 0, [ , , ] ,i i i iT T H T m H T mH H    A A A A . (14) 
We apply Eq. (14) to Eq. (12) to obtain 
         
         
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
, [ , , ] ,
, [ , , ] ,
i i i i
II I I
T T H T m H T m
T T H T m H T m
H H
H H
     
     
A A A A
A A A A  
 
 
   
 
   1 0 1 0 0.I
i I
i
i I
i
i i
I
I I
T T
T T
V V
V V
W W
                                
A AA A A A    (15a) 
The measurement formula, Eq. (15a) requires the data of  0,iH T A  , which are the 
expenditure on housing lot consumption with 0A . This is, however, not observable because 
amenity level 1A   is achieved sometime from ct T n    to t=T, implying that 0A   is not 
present at T. So  0,iH T A  should be estimated. 
One usual estimation method is to use time-fixed effects which are constant across 
locations. Indeed, these time-fixed effects are often used in difference-in-differences 
approaches. For example, if log functional forms are assumed, the growth rate of the 
expenditure on housing lot consumption,    , / ,i ij jH HT T mA A  (j= 0 or 1) is constant 
across locations. In the case of linear functions, the growth amount, 
   , ,i ij jH HT T m A A  is identical across locations. These are estimated as time-fixed 
effects in the difference-in-differences.  When applying the time-fixed effect of a linear 
function to Eq. (12) yields Eq. (15b), because 
       0 0 0 0, , , ,i i IIH T T m TH H T mH    A A A A . 
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1 0 1 0, , , ,
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i I
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i I
T H TH m T H T m
V V
V V
W W
H
T T
T T
     
                                
A A A A
A AA A A A        (15b) 
Eq. (15b) is very easily applied because all variables except for the willingness to pay for the 
amenities are easily observable. Note that this is simply an example in the case of constant 
time-fixed effects in a linear function. We can use a more flexible form to estimate  0,iH T A  
(e.g., the combination of time-fixed effects and local fixed effects). We can summarize what 
we have obtained as Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 (proposed approach).  We can estimate the willingness to pay for 
amenities using a measurement formula, Eq. (12) when the amenities change instantly, or 
Eq. (15a) otherwise. If we use constant time-effects in a linear regression form in a 
difference-in-differences approach, Eq. (15a) can be expressed as Eq.(15b). 
 
Proposition 1 implies that the resident’s willingness to pay for the marginal change in the 
amenities in location i, that is (    
i i
i i
T
T
V A
V W
 
  ), can be obtained with housing lot 
prices and housing lot consumption using data at two time points, irrespective of whether the 
city is open or closed, using the data at two points of time: before and after the amenity change.  
3.3 Taking account of condominiums 
Land is occupied by not only houses but also condominiums. The willingness to pay by a 
household is reflected in floor space rent directly but it is not reflected in land rent in a simple 
way because a number of households share the land in the case of condominiums. Surprisingly, 
in the context of hedonic approach, condominiums have not been explicitly taken into account.  
Since a floor rent reflects household’s willingness to pay, the following discussion 
explores the relationship between floor rent and land rent. First, we suppose developers’ 
behavior as Brueckner et al. (2017) and others have assumed. Developers construct 
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condominiums using capital (i.e., housing materials) and land. The number of developers is 
large, so the market is perfectly competitive. The cost function of supplying floor area is given 
as 𝐹ሺ𝑆ሻ  , where  𝑆  is capital/land ratio, which implies building height. Setting the inverse 
function of 𝐹ሺ𝑆ሻ as 𝑆ሺ𝐹ሻ ,  𝑆ሺ𝐹ሻ  implies the capital necessary for constructing floor area 𝐹 . 
The profit of a perfect competitive developer in zone i is defined as  
( )i i i i iF r S F P    ,           (16) 
where   is the profit, r  is floor rent, and P  is land rent. The price of capital is normalized 
at one. Note that, up to this section, we did not consider condominiums. Since housing lots are 
placed directly on land, housing lot rents were equal to land rents. In this section, we can 
replace housing lot rents with floor rent when the households reside in condominiums. Floor 
area rents are determined by bid-rent function as housing lot rents. So, we use the same 
notation. But, to clarify the difference between land rents and floor rents in condominiums, 
we use P  as land rent in this case. 
The profit of the developer is maximized but is zero because of perfect competition. That 
is, 0.i   Landowners rent their land to highest bidders. So, developers maximize the land 
rent as follows. 
max ( )
i
i i i i
F
P F r S F  .      (17) 
The first order condition is ( ) 0r i S F    . This first order condition implies that iF  and
( )iS F  are functions of ir . Accordingly, substituting them into Eq. (17), we have 
( ) ( )i i i iP F r r S r  .     (18)  
To see the change in land prices with respect to amenities, we differentiate Eq. (18) with 
respect to amenities A. 
( )
i i
idP rF r
dA A
                                (19) 
Equation (19) is obtained by assuming that iF  is variable. However, floor area ratio regulation 
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is common in urban areas. In this situation, iF  is fixed at a regulated level5 if the regulation 
is binding. Even in this situation, the same equation can be obtained directly from Eq. (17). 
Indeed, Eq. (6) in Brueckner et al. (2017), which can be expressed as  i idP rFdA A   in 
our notation, expresses this binding case. Multiplying both sides with ih , dividing them by F, 
and finally exchanging the right-hand side with the left-hand side, yields 
1
( )
i i i
i i
i i
hr P Ph
A F r A n A
       ,                       (20) 
where in  is household density. Using Eq. (20) and Eq. (15b), we have  
       
 
   
 
   ,1 ,0 ,0,1
 
    
1 1 1 1
I I
I I
i i
I I
I I
I I
i i I I
i i I I
P P P P
n n
T T m T T m
V T V T
V
n
T V T
W W
n
                    
                         
A AA A A A 
.        (21) 
We can summarize what we have obtained as Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 (proposed approach with the existence of condominiums).  We can 
estimate the willingness to pay for amenities using a measurement formula, Eq. (21). 
 
The measurement method shown in Proposition 2 can be used in the existence of 
condominiums. In central cities, there are many condominiums. In this case, Eq. (21) should 
be used. This measurement formula is intuitively interpreted as follows. In the case of 
condominiums, multiple households residing in a condominium share the land. Accordingly, 
when some local amenities increase, the increase in the land price is related to the multiple 
households’ WTPs for the increase in the amenities. This is why household density is used in 
the case of condominiums, instead of lot size in the case of detached houses. But note that 
 
5 Regarding optimal setting of floor area ratios, see Kono and Joshi (2019). 
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this formula can be applied to detached houses as it is, simply because the building is 
occupied by only one household. 
 
4. Difference from the cross-sectional hedonic approach 
The proposed approach, as derived in the preceding section, uses the relation between the level 
of utility, the level of amenities, and land rents. In this respect, the proposed approach 
resembles those of Pines and Weiss (1976) and Scotchmer (1985, 1986), which explore the 
relation between cross-sectional land rents and the willingness to pay for amenities using the 
static general equilibrium model. This section explains the differences and similarities between 
their static cross-sectional hedonic approach and the proposed dynamic approach. 
4.1 Relation between the cross-sectional approach and the proposed approach 
First, we review a discussion by Pines and Weiss (1976), which explore a method to estimate 
the willingness to pay for amenities using cross-section analysis. Although many papers 
analyze the relationship between rent and willingness to pay for amenities, the basic theoretical 
structure used is completely identical to Pines and Weiss. Pines and Weiss (1976) presume that 
there are many locations and that the continuum function of a single amenity factor a can be 
formed using the cross-section data. Because the utility level ( , , )U x h a , where x  is composite 
good consumption and h  is lot size consumption, is common among the locations under the 
free migration assumption, the following relation holds: 
 ( , , ) 0dU x h a
da
 .  (22) 
That is, if people migrate to another location with a different level of the amenity factor 
a, then the same utility level is attained, thereby maintaining the utility level. Total 
differentiation of Eq. (22), with U U r
xh
    and slight rearrangement, yields 
 0a a
U
x ha d d r dU a a
a

       
,  (23) 
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where r  is the land rent and the price of composite good x  is 1. 
The budget constraint is represented as w x rh  , where w  signifies income. Using this 
equation, differentiating the budget constraint with respect to a gives 
 0a a a aw x h rd d r d h d
a a a a
          , (24) 
where we assume that 0w
a
 , whereas the original Pines and Weiss paper does not assume 
this. Combining Eq. (23) and Eq. (24) yields 
 0 a a
U
r ah d dUa
x
    
.  (25) 
Pines and Weiss (1976) state that Eq. (25) is used for measuring the willingness to pay for 
amenities6, U U
a x
   . We summarize this result as the Pines and Weiss proposition.  
Pines and Weiss (1976)’s Proposition (the cross-sectional approach). If people migrate 
freely among locations, then the change in land rents, and the willingness to pay for the 
marginal change in the amenities are as shown in Eq. (25). Consequently, if one obtains 
data on the land consumption and land rents, then the willingness to pay for amenities is 
calculable based on Eq. (25). 
 
The first term of the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is the lot size multiplied by the change in 
land rent; the second term is the willingness to pay for the marginal change in amenity. The 
composition is the same as Eq. (15a) and (15b) derived in our dynamic case. 
Pines and Weiss (1977) assume that there is only one amenity, but the rent cannot be 
explained by only one amenity in a real city. So, extending to many amenities, we obtain  
0
U
rh d dU
x
    
A AAA   ,      (25’)  
6 This equation corresponds to the equation above eq. (21) on page 10 in Pines and Weiss. Actually, their 
main target is not to obtain this equation. Their target is to obtain the social benefit function, which is 
expressed by eq. (20) in their paper. 
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where   expresses inner product, and the variables before and after   are in a vector. 
Eq. (25’) is based on the cross-sectional changes. For the time-series changes, the level of 
the utility can change, whereas the cross-sectional hedonic approach presumes a common 
utility level across locations. Figure 2 expresses the relation between a cross-sectional change, 
a time-series change, and a difference in differences. In a cross-sectional change, because of 
free migration at time t, the level of the utility does not change even if people migrate to 
another location (i.e., location i to j). This implies that the increase in a utility-enhancing 
amenity increases the land rent to maintain the constant utility. In a time-series change, the 
utility can change for various reasons, including a change in amenity. In a difference-in-
differences case, the increase in the level of the equilibrium utility from time t to time t’ (i.e., 
V(t’)-V(t)) is constant over different amenities because of free migration (i.e. Assumption 1). 
 
 
Figure 2 Traditional cross-sectional approach and our proposed approach  
4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approach 
The cross-sectional approach demands the use of data for all local amenities, such as 
landscape characteristics and geographical characteristics (e.g., the existence of a nearby train 
station or parks) because cross-sectional differences in land rent are explained using cross-
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sectional differences in all local amenities. Our proposed approach requires no data that do not 
change in a time-series because such unchanging amenities contribute nothing to any utility 
change that occurs in a time series. Many local amenities such as landscape characteristics 
(existence of nearby rivers), the existence of nearby train stations, and positioning in relation 
to roads do not change during a certain time. Since the proposed approach need not consider 
such amenities, it might require less data than the cross-sectional hedonic approach. 
This difference in the required data from the cross-sectional approach generates two 
advantages: 1) data on amenities that have not changed need not be collected, and 2) in 
estimation of parameters, fewer amenities are used as explanatory variables in the proposed 
approach than in the cross-sectional approach.  
Advantage 1) is important when an analyst cannot obtain detailed data on the target areas. 
This lack of data often occurs because the number of attributes of each location is essentially 
vast. Indeed, some local environmental factors (e.g. atmosphere) cannot be collected as 
quantitative data, or the analyst may unintentionally ignore the difference in such local factors 
if they check only documented data. Actually, it is hard for analysts to visit all the points they 
use as data. Accordingly, it is normal to estimate hedonic price functions, ignoring some 
undocumented amenities. In that case, our approach, requiring only time-series-changing 
amenity data, has an advantage because such factors may be constant over some time interval. 
Advantage 2) can be explained as follows. Cross-sectional hedonic regressions often 
exhibit a multicollinearity problem in the estimation of the land rent function because it uses 
all amenities, such as the landscape character, as explanatory variables. In contrast, the 
proposed approach requires no data that do not change in a time series. Accordingly, this 
parsimony of explanatory variables often prevents multicollinearity problems, which is a great 
benefit. On the other hand, the proposed approach cannot measure the value of amenities that 
are dropped from the cross-sectional approach. However, this point presents no problem 
because a cost–benefit analysis need not measure unchanging amenities. 
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The proposed approach, however, has a restriction: it necessitates either the measurement 
of the marginal utility of income or the assumption of equal marginal utility of income among 
locations (e.g. quasi-linear utility function or maximization of the social welfare over the 
whole city through some policies.)  
Although many time-series-unchanged amenities exist, amenities that change similarly 
over the whole area can also be found. Examples of such amenities are the effects of global 
warming and changes in interest rates. If the time-series change in such global amenities 
similarly affects the utility of individuals over the whole area, then we need not consider them 
because their effects are distributed equally. This advantage is shared with other difference-in-
differences approaches. Consequently, the proposed approach requires fewer data than the 
cross-sectional hedonic approach does. 
As described above, the proposed approach presents advantages and disadvantages. 
Agents conducting a cost–benefit analysis should choose the method from among established 
methods (e.g., contingent valuation method, travel cost method…) while comparing the 
advantages and disadvantages for their given situation. The proposed approach can be 
considered as an additional option or as a supplement to other methods. 
 
5. An illustrative application of the proposed approach 
This section presents the application of the proposed method to an esthetic project as an 
illustration to demonstrate its procedures concretely. We apply the approach to empirically 
estimate the willingness to pay for utility line undergrounding in residential areas, which is a 
neighborhood amenity, in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Undergrounding projects are 
proceeding worldwide, although there are many regions (e.g., European capital cities) without 
utility lines on roads. In particular, Japanese cities’ undergrounding rates are very low7.   
 
7 For example, the rate in the 23 special wards of Tokyo is 7%, and that in the municipality of Osaka is 5%. 
Undergrounding rates are still low in developed as well as developing countries. While large cities have 
high undergrounding rates in Europe, some countries as a whole have low rates (e.g., 83% in the UK, 39% 
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The purpose of this empirical research is to show the analysis procedure and to highlight 
the advantages and the disadvantages of the method. For that purpose, we compare the 
conventional method and our method in terms of estimation process and estimation results. 
Note that our main purpose is not to measure accurate value of the willingness to pay for utility 
line undergrounding, although the estimates we obtain are statistically significant. Indeed, 
there are some limitations of this empirical research as follows. 
First, the land prices we used8 are prices assessed by governments, although these prices 
are used very widely, including in many hedonic studies (e.g., Kanemoto and Nakamura, 1986; 
Kanemoto et al., 1996; Nakagawa et al., 2009; Tabuchi, 1996). As Nakagawa et al. (2009) 
explain, the land price data is assessed by the certified real estate appraisers. The real estate 
appraisers usually pay attention to market prices quoted in the neighborhood in assessing these 
land prices; in this sense, the market assessment of environmental factors may be reflected in 
the Koji-Chika data. Ideally, we need actual land price data. Secondly, undergrounding lines 
involves associated amenity changes such as road and sidewalk widening and tree planting. 
We do not obtain information about which associated-amenities changed and how, because 
they are not described in government reports. Lastly, we need lot sizes to calculate WTP as 
shown in eqs. (25) and (26). But there are no available data on lot sizes. So, we use building 
areas instead of lot sizes. The lot size includes areas other than the building area, such as 
a garden, which would increase the value of WTP. However, the real WTP and our 
calculated WTP are roughly correlated because the building coverage ratio does not differ 
much across buildings. Note that these limitations are not critical problems for our purpose.   
 
in France and 33% in Italy based on the length of a distribution circuit of 1kv, according to Eurelectric., 
2013). 
8 We use the data of ‘road rating (valuation for inheritance tax)’, not ‘road rating (valuation for fixed asset 
tax)’. These are assessed by the national tax agency and by municipal governments, respectively, using 
the same method. There is a possibility that land appraisal for fixed asset tax might be biased because the 
municipal government has an incentive for over-or-under estimation for various reasons. The sample size 
of road rating for inheritance tax is enough for our analysis. 
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5.1  Estimation target 
Utility line undergrounding is a public project for the purpose of providing safe and 
comfortable pedestrian space, improvement of urban landscape, improvement of disaster 
prevention capability9 and smooth traffic. Wires have been buried by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT, hereafter) under projects starting in 1986 all 
over Japan. However, the rate of undergrounding utility lines in Japanese cities is still low. 
The rate of undergrounded utility lines on roads is 10% in Sapporo, 30% in the Tokyo 
metropolitan area, and 14% in Kyoto10 according to the MLIT (2014). 
 5.2 Data 
We use the data of land prices, iR  from the data of ‘road rating (valuation for inheritance 
tax)’ which are obtained from the Research Center for Property Assessment System. This 
data defines a ‘road’ as a road between two intersections, and it is appraised at almost every 
road in urban areas so that most undergrounded points can be used for estimation. Since 
1994, the assessors have been mandated to produce the values which are 80% of the values 
of the land market value publication. Thus, we need to divide the WTP estimated by 0.8 to 
adjust the scale and derive the market value.  
We use the data of land prices ir and land consumption ih  in 2015, 2009, and 2003. We 
converted the nominal land prices into real prices (2015 prices) using the GDP deflator by 
dividing the 2009 data and the 2003 data by deflator 1.0088 and 1.0642. For our method, we 
use all the data, and for the traditional cross-sectional analysis, we use only 2015 data. 
Our target is the residential areas in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Considering the 
 
9 When a big earthquake occurs, electric wires and poles fall down on to roads. This prevents the area 
from quickly recovering from the disaster. 
10 Compared to these Japanese rates, cities in other countries have much higher rates. For example, Hong 
Kong has 100 %, Seoul has 46%, Paris and London have 100%, and New York has 83%, according to the 
documents issued by the MLIT (2014). 
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locations of undergrounded lines, we target Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba prefectures. 
In addition, we only use the data of cities or wards which have implemented undergrounding 
projects. The target cities and wards are Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, Shinjuku, Bunkyo, Koto, 
Shinagawa, Meguro, Nakano, and Toshima wards in Tokyo;  Tsurumi, Kanagawa, Naka, Isogo, 
Kanazawa, Totsuka, Aoba, Nakahara, Takatsu wards in Kanagawa; Chuo, Hanamigawa, Inage, 
Wakaba, Mihama wards and Ichikawa city in Chiba; Kita, Chuo, and Minami wards, Kawagoe, 
Kawaguchi, Tokorozawa, Kasukabe, and Sakato cities in Saitama.  
The number of lines undergrounded during the target period (2003-2015) in the target area 
is 53. The number of lines undergrounded from 2003 to 2009 is 11, and the number from 2009 
to 2015 is 42. Furthermore, in order to eliminate the effects of outliers, we exclude the top 
5% and the bottom 5% of land prices. We show the number of roads with undergrounded 
utility lines (abbreviated as UGUL in the Tables) and that in the neighborhood in Table 1. 
It shows the descriptive statistics on land price for analysis 1 and analysis 2 (1000 JPY). 
The average increase in the land prices in the areas with undergrounded lines is about 30,000 
JPY per square meter from 2003 to 2015, whereas that in the areas without undergrounding 
projects is about 15, 000 JPY per square meter. So, the undergrounding projects increase the 
land prices on average. 
Undergrounding utility lines may have spatial spillover effects. The effects are 
composed of esthetic benefits, improved traffic flow, and increased safety in disaster 
situations. From the esthetic viewpoint, residents walk in their neighborhood so might 
enjoy the roads with undergrounded lines. From the viewpoints of traffic flow as well as 
safety in disaster situations, residents use the roads with undergrounded lines.  
To capture such neighborhood benefit, we define ‘the roads in the neighborhood not 
facing roads with undergrounded lines’ as the roads which at least partly lie within 50 m 
of the roads with undergrounded lines. Note that these neighboring roads do not include 
the road with undergrounded lines. We call this area ‘the neighborhood’. 
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Our approach does not have to consider amenities that do not change, (e.g. river). We 
chose newly opened train stations (within 1 km) and highway interchanges (within 5 km) as 
dynamically changeable amenities. But the parameters of the train stations and highway 
interchanges are not statistically significant.  
Table 1 Data Summary 
(Unit: 1000 JPY excluding sample sizes) 
Group or Variable Statistics Year 2003  2009  2015 
Undergrounded utility lines (UGUL) 
undergrounded from 2003 to 2015 
Mean  209  241  239 
Median 155  173  170 
Standard deviation 93  122  123 
Sample size (lines) 53  53  53 
Neighborhood of UGUL  
Mean 157  169  164 
Median 146  154  150 
Standard deviation 45  60  60 
Sample size (lines) 170  171  171 
Control (without UGUL) 
Mean 189  211  204 
Median 164  173  170 
Standard deviation 73  103  100 
Sample size (lines) 32132  32401  32409 
 
For the traditional cross-sectional hedonic approach, we use data on the nearest station, 
elementary school, clinic, hospital, and park, and whether a road is narrow, medium, or wide, 
and other factors. Furthermore, we set the area dummy as location-specific fixed effects of 
each area. All the explanatory variables are shown in Table A1 in Appendix 2. 
5.3 Estimation 
Under the assumptions described above, Eq. (21) is the measurement formula. We specify Eq. 
(21) in the following two manners. Specification 1 specifies the effect of undergrounding 
utility lines and nearby undergrounding lines as constant values. Specification 1 considers both 
time-fixed effects and local-fixed effect, which are adopted often in a standard difference-in-
differences approach. However, as shown in Table 1, the number of undergrounded points is 
30 
 
small. So, the undergrounded points may not have been randomly chosen11. To reflect this, 
dividing all the sample data into 10 quantiles according to the 2009 land prices, we consider a 
different time-fixed effect for each decile12. This is Specification II.  
Our model 
Specification I:  
    2003 2009 2009 20152015 20091   = + ( )i i i iti k k ki
kn
TP B                (26a) 
Specification II:  
    2003 2009 2009 201510 2015, 2009,
1
1   = + ( )i i i iti q q k k ki
q k
TP B
n
      

         (26b) 
 
where iB  is the fixed effect term,  t  in Specification I represents the fixed-time effect term 
for year t, ,t q  in Specification II represents the fixed-time effect term for year t and decile q, 
k  are parameters for amenity k which dynamically change.  
a bt t
i
k   is a dummy variable 
expressing a change in amenity k from t  to bt  , including whether nearby utility poles are 
removed or not.  In particular,  it  is an i.i.d. error term. 
The two specifications reflect the situation of the current target. Note that original 
measurement Eq. (21) can be more flexible. In the above two specifications, we assume a 
common k  across the two time intervals. The willingness to pay for amenities can change 
over time. If we assume different values of k   in different time intervals, we can identify the 
 
11 The Tokyo Olympic is determined in September of 2013. After this, Tokyo promotes undergrounding 
projects. Our latest data is 2015. We use the date of the completion of undergrounding projects. Because it 
takes time to complete the projects, our data is not affected by the determination of the Tokyo Olympic.   
12 In difference-in-differences approaches, parallel trends are often verified in data. However, in our cases, 
it is impossible to check this because data earlier than 2009 cannot be obtained in text which can be 
identified by computers. So, instead of this parallel trend verification, we used the time-fixed effects for 
each quantile. If undergrounding points are chosen according to land rents, this can avoid a relevant bias 
in the estimation. 
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change in the willingness to pay. However, we did not set different k  this time because the 
number of undergrounding cases is not large. So, estimated k  can be interpreted as average 
willingness to pay for amenities over time. In addition, although Eq. (21) can allow 
explanatory variables to be continuous variables, the explanatory variables in the current case 
are only dummy variables (i.e., 1 or 0).  
To compare our approach with the conventional cross-sectional hedonic approach, we 
measure the benefit of undergrounding utility poles, using the cross-sectional approach. The 
conventional cross-sectional approach is set as 
  1 0, i ik k Ci
k
Tr b    A    (27) 
where 0  is a constant, and k  is the parameter for amenity k.  kb  represents the level of 
amenity k,  and iC  represents an i.i.d. error term.  
We estimate parameters in Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) by application of ordinary least-squares 
regression analysis. But the parameters of Eq. (26) are estimated after the within 
transformation.  
5.4 Results 
Estimates using our method are shown in Table 2. The estimated parameters of Eq. (26) are 
statistically significant (undergrounded areas parameter, p=0.1%; neighboring areas parameter, 
p= 1.0).  
Table 2a. Estimation of Eq. (26) in Specification I 
  Coefficient Standard Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Significant level
Undergrounded areas 1049955 176005 5.97  2.45E-09 *** 
Neighboring areas of undergrounded lines 289255 97759 2.96  3.09E-03 ** 
Individual fixed effects   Yes 
Economic trend (Pref.  Year dummies)   Yes 
Adjusted R-squared (full) 0.9923  
Note: +, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2b. Estimation of Eq. (26) in Specification II 
  Coefficient Standard Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Significant level
Undergrounded areas 962456 165407 5.82  5.96E-09 *** 
Neighboring areas of undergrounded lines 270640 92050 2.94  3.28E-03 ** 
Individual fixed effects    Yes 
Economic trend (Pref.  Year dummies)    Yes 
Heterogeneous time trend (Price quantile * 
Year dummies)  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared (full) 0.9931 
Note: +, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
The willingness to pay can be represented basically by the parameter of the target amenity 
in the proposed method. In our case, dividing the estimated parameters by 0.8, which is the 
conversion rate of the real prices and the data prices, we can estimate the willingness to pay 
for utility line undergrounding, as shown in our theoretical section The willingness to pay for 
undergrounding the utility lines in the front of the home is approximately 1.32 million JPY13. 
That in the neighborhood of undergrounded lines is approximately 0.37 million JPY. These 
are stock values. Using the discount rate 0.25%, which is the geometric average value of the 
10-year Japanese national bond yields from 1990 to 2014, we can calculate the willingness to 
pay per month. Those values are shown in the lower line in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Willingness to pay for utility line undergrounding based on Eq. (26) 
 
  Undergrounded areas Neighboring areas of undergrounded areas 
Specification I 
WTP per household (million yen) 1.31 0.36 
WTP per household per month (yen) 2734 753 
Specification II 
WTP per household (million yen) 1.20 0.34 
WTP per household per month (yen) 2506 705 
Note: 1$ ≈ 100 yen. 
 
 
13 As we have already explained, when calculating WTP in our paper, the lot size is replaced by the building 
area dues to data constraint. So, the exact WTP is larger than those in Table 3. 
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Estimates of the parameters based on the conventional cross-sectional hedonic approach 
are presented in Table 4. Adjusted R-squared is reasonably high, and most of the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant at a level of 1%. Using the measurement function Eq. (25), 
we can calculate the willingness to pay in the case of the cross-sectional analyses. The lot size 
is required to calculate this14. In our case, the median value is used.15  
 
Table 4. parameter estimation - cross-sectional approach  
 
  Coefficient Standard Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Significant level
Undergrounded areas 26975 3830 7.04  1.91E-12 *** 
Neighboring areas of undergrounded lines 7270 2358 3.08  2.05E-03 ** 
 
Other explanatory variables        (See the Appendix for the values)   
 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.908   
WTP per household one time (million yen) 1.35  
Note:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Estimated parameters 
of the other explanatory variables are shown in Appendix 2 with the statistics.  
The estimate in the cross-sectional hedonic approach is 1.35 million yen 
(=26,975(yen/m2)×median per-household building area 49.95(m2)) per household in terms of 
stock value. The estimates with the proposed method (1.31 million in Specification I, and 1.20 
million in Specification II) is very close to this (1.35 million). In other words, the conventional 
hedonic approach and our difference-in-differences approach yield similar results.  
As we have already shown in the theoretical section, the number of explanatory variables 
in our proposed method is smaller than that in the conventional cross-sectional hedonic 
approach. This implies that the possibility of multicollinearity can be reduced in the proposed 
 
14 As we have already explained, when calculating WTP, the data of building area is used instead of lot 
sizes due to data constraint. So, the exact WTP is larger than those in Table 4. 
15 We can use the average value. However, an economic value usually includes excess values, so the 
average value usually is greater than the median. In the case of lot sizes, some rich people have very large 
lot sizes. This value does not necessarily reflect the normal condition. So we use the median. However, 
the average lot size in this area is . So, the result will not change much. 
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method.  
We compare the levels of estimates of our method with those in a previous paper. McNair 
and Abelson (2010) estimate the willingness to pay for undergrounding nearby utility lines16 
using the conventional hedonic approach, using the data of Canberra. Their estimates per 
household in terms of stock values is $12,350 (=1.30 million yen with the 2014 average 
exchange rate of 106 yen/$). Our estimates in the three methods are about 1.31, 1.20 and 1.35 
million yen. These values are very similar to McNair and Abelson’s estimation. But, to 
calculate our willingness to pay, we use building sizes instead of lot sizes. The lot size is larger 
than the building area. So, if we used the lot size to calculate the WTP, our estimates would be 
larger. This difference arises first from the differences between road conditions in Japan and 
Australia. For example, the visual impact of electric wires in Japan is greater than in Australia 
because roads in Australia are wider than roads in Japan, and the percentage of the field of 
view occupied by electric wires in Australia is far less than in Japan. In addition, projects of 
undergrounding utility lines involve refurbishing roads and sidewalks and often involves 
widening sidewalks and planting street trees.  
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper presents a theoretical method to estimate the value of amenities. Using the spatial 
economy’s property of common dynamic changes in the utility across locations, we derive a 
formula to estimate the willingness to pay for amenities using panel data. The advantages of 
the proposed approach over the conventional cross-sectional approach are savings related to 
data collection and the increased possibility of avoiding multicollinearity problems arising 
from parameter estimation. Although a cross-sectional hedonic approach should factor in all 
the geographically different amenities to explain the rent differences, some local 
 
16 McNair and Abelson (2010) do not define the affected area of undergrounding utilities in terms of 
distance from residential houses. However, judging from their maps in the paper, the affected areas are 
defined as blocks in the immediate vicinity of the residents’ homes.  
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environmental factors (e.g. atmosphere) cannot be collected as quantitative data. Our approach, 
requiring only time-series-changing amenity data, has an advantage if such local factors are 
constant over time. However, a key restriction is that either the measurement or the assumption 
of marginal utility of income is necessary for provision of correct measures. 
Every cost–benefit analysis method (e.g. contingent valuation method (CVM), travel cost 
method) has advantages and disadvantages. The method should be chosen depending on the 
situation. The proposed method presents one such option. Alternatively, a combination of this 
method with another method (e.g. CVM) might be useful. 
This paper presents one illustrative application of the proposed method. The method is 
applicable to the measurement of values of any amenity associated with the land: 
environmental factors such as natural environment and landscape, and public infrastructure 
such as parks. Additional applications are necessary in future to ascertain more broad 
applicability of the proposed method. 
 
Appendix 1 
We first arrange Eq. (9) to eliminate an unobservable term,
    1 0, ,
i iV T V TA A . Among 
locations i that have a positive population, i.e. 0iN  , we select one location. Without loss of 
generality, assuming that location I is selected by presuming that for 0IN  , we have 
        1 0 1 0, , , ,  for any {1,2,..., 1}i Ii IV z V z V z V z i I    A A A A , (A1) 
if Assumption 1 holds. This expresses that the increase in the level of the utility associated 
with a change in amenities from 0A  to 1A  is equal among locations  whether the 
area, which comprises all locations , is open or closed (i.e., whether or not free 
migration can occur between the target area and other areas).  
Under Assumption 1, we can eliminate the unobservable term,    1 0, ,i iV T V TA A , by 
calculating the difference in this term between location i and location I as  
{1,..., }i I
{1,..., }i I
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for any location  { 1,2,..., 1: 0 }i ti i I N    .  
Second, we arrange Eq. (A2) to eliminate another unobservable term,  
i
i
V
r t

 , using Roy's 
identity. To use Roy’s identity     
 i ii
i i
V V
h t
r
T
t W
T    , we arrange Eq. (A2) using 
 i
i
V
W
T
  
and  I IVW
T
  to yield Eq. (10).  
Appendix 2.  
Table A1 shows a detailed version of the parameter estimation shown in Table 4. 
Table A1. Parameter estimation for the cross-sectional approach 
  Variables Coef. Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
Undergrounded areas 26974.7 3829.667 7.04  1.91E-12
Neighboring areas 
of undergrounded 
lines 
 7269.65 2357.767 3.08  0.002049
(Intercept) 180562 2878.117 62.74  0 the main station -2.5763 0.121 -21.34  2.2E-100 the nearest station -27.013 0.437 -61.79  0 the nearest bus stop 13.498 1.534 8.80  1.42E-18 the nearest elementary school -5.7649 0.913 -6.31  2.76E-10
Distance to the nearest junior high school -12.565 0.587 -21.40  6.4E-101 the nearest clinic -31.156 1.405 -22.18  3.5E-108 the nearest hospital -3.8691 0.440 -8.80  1.49E-18 the nearest post office -17.257 0.899 -19.20  1.14E-81
the existence of a nearby park 24389 2482.283 9.83  9.43E-23
New towns developed after 1976 306.95 979.395 0.31  0.753973
New towns developed before 1976  707.383 693.599 1.02  0.307797
Landscape planning area 8838.29 723.252 12.22  2.88E-34
Narrow road - - - - 
Medium road 7293.38 443.8948 16.4304 2.03E-60
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Wide road 15632.8 2356.939 6.63266 3.35E-11
Local fixed effects omitted   
   
Sample size 32633   
Adjusted R-squared 0.908   
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